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n this article, we study tradeoffs associated with homeownership and
renting. We consider a model in which housing capital generates housing
services, but also requires regular maintenance/upkeep effort. The even-
tual resale value of a home is a random variable whose distribution depends
on the amount of upkeep performed on the property. In the model, we have a
risk-averseagent/householdwhowantstopurchaseaﬂowofhousingservices.
The household also consumes a nonhousing good and leisure. Maintenance
on the piece of housing capital occupied by the household can be performed




can observe the household’s effort, consumption, or savings. We show that
simple renting from the bank/landlord is an optimal contract for the provision
of housing services to the household, conditional on the outside property
managerbeinghired. Conditionalonthemanagernotbeinghired,itisoptimal
for the bank/landlord to lend the money to the household to acquire housing
servicesbypurchasingahome. Inthisarrangement,thebank’sloanissecured
by a zero-down, ﬁxed-rate, nonrecourse mortgage that prohibits subordinated
ﬁnancing.
Inourmodel, owningahomeisriskybecauseitsfuturevalueisuncertain.
By purchasing a home, the household exposes itself to the idiosyncratic risk
in the resale value of the property. This risk is partially assumed by the
bank that grants the mortgage. The mortgage contract is nonrecourse, which
means that the household’s mortgage liability is limited to the value of the
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collateral. Thus, the household can walk away from the house and turn its
ownership over to the bank at any time without any further recourse. This is
what the household chooses to do if the resale value of the property turns out
to be low. If the resale value is high, the household sells the home, pays off
the mortgage, and pockets the difference. The mortgage, therefore, provides
partial insurance to the homeowner. If the household is to care for the house,
this insurance must be partial, because the household needs an incentive to
provide costly upkeep on the property. The optimal mortgage contract results
from the tradeoff between the household’s desire for insurance and the bank’s
desire to give the household adequate incentive to care for the property. Just
making the purchase of a home feasible to the household, in particular, is not
a goal that the mortgage contract serves in this model.
The purpose of this article is to study renting and owning as two possible
ways of contracting for a household’s purchase of housing services. The
model we consider is useful for this purpose because the contract that the
household obtains in equilibrium clearly resembles either a renting contract
or an ownership contract with a mortgage, depending on the values of the
parameters. The model, therefore, provides a framework in which we can
discuss the costs and beneﬁts of homeownership relative to renting.
The main lesson from the model is that owning a home must necessarily
expose the owner to property upkeep costs and the idiosyncratic home resale
value risk. This aspect of homeownership should not be overlooked by poli-
cymakersformulatingandimplementinggovernmentpolicytowardhousing.1
We use a simple parameterization of the model to show that for an average
household,absenttaxdistortionsorotherpolicyinterventions,rentingactually
dominates homeownership. Our model can be extended to study the effects
of various tax-code-based and other government interventions in the housing
market.
The model studied in this article is highly stylized. We assume that trans-
action costs associated with buying or selling real estate are zero. We assume
that duration of tenancy/ownership is known in advance (no random moving
shocks are allowed). In our model, the household does not face any income or
employment risk. We do not distinguish between real and nominal contracts,
and so we have no inﬂation risk. The discussion in Campbell (2006) suggests
that all these factors can be important and should be examined in future work.
This article is related to two main strands of the economic literature
on housing ﬁnance: the studies of optimal mortgage contracts (e.g., Dunn
and Spatt 1985; Chari and Jagannathan 1989; Campbell and Cocco 2003;
Piskorski and Tchistyi 2010), and the studies comparing renting and owning
(Shelton1968; RosenandRosen1980; Chambers, Garriga, andSchlagenhauf
1 Jaffee and Quigley (2010) provide an overview of government policy toward housing in the
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2009). This article, to our knowledge, is unique to the extent that it allows
for both the choice between renting and owning and the choice of an optimal
ﬁnancial contract associated with either option, all in a model in which the
contract structures are endogenous (derived from the fundamentals of the en-
vironment) rather than assumed exogenously. This article is also related to
the large literature studying moral hazard models (see Prescott [1999] for an
overview). Our model differs from the classic moral hazard problem in two
respects. First, in addition to the household’s upkeep effort, the principal, i.e.,
the bank/landlord, does not observe the household’s savings, labor income, or
consumption. Second, the principal has the option to circumvent the moral
hazard problem altogether by hiring a property manager, whose work on the
property is veriﬁable.
The article is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section
2 studies efﬁcient contracts with hired upkeep. Section 3 studies efﬁcient
contractswithoccupant-providedupkeep. Section4comparesthetwoclasses
of efﬁcient contracts in a parameterized example. Section 5 concludes.
1. THE MODEL
A household is looking to purchase housing services for a ﬁxed period of time
of length T. (The number T is intended to be a typical amount of time that a
household spends living at one location, i.e., between moves from one place
to another. Our parameterization in Section 4 will take T to be seven years).
Time is indexed by t ∈ [0,T].
Housing
Housing is a form of capital that works as follows. Size of a housing unit is
measured in dollars of its value at t = 0. The gross growth of the value of a
housing unit over the course of the period is a random variable denoted by R.
We assume that Pr{R ∈{ R,R}} = 1 with R < R and Pr{R = R} depends
on the amount of effective upkeep effort, U, exerted on the property over the




p if U ≥ ˆ U
for some ˆ U>0 and 0 <p<1. The number ˆ U represents adequate upkeep.
Thus, if U ≥ ˆ U, a property of initial value H0 will be worth at t = T the
amount HT, which equals RH0 with probability p or RH0 with probability
1 − p. If effective upkeep is inadequate, i.e., U<ˆ U, the property will be
worth RH0 with probability one.
We assume that upkeep must be provided at all times in [0,T). In par-





Note that under this functional form it is a waste to provide nonconstant levels
of upkeep because only the minimum level matters. Thus, we can take that
Ut will be chosen to be constant: Ut = U for all t.
Upkeep is generated by hours of upkeep effort/work. Upkeep effort can
be delivered by either the occupant of the property or an outside manager. Let
m ∈{ 0,1} be the indicator of whether or not an outside manager is hired.
Thus, m = 0 means that there is no outside manager and any upkeep on the
property is up to the agent. Let ht denote the number of man-hours of upkeep
donebytheoccupant. Lethm
t denotethenumberofman-hoursofupkeepdone
by the manager, if one is hired. Because of the costs related to the monitoring
of the manager, the manager’s need to travel to the physical property site to
provideservices, etc., onehourofmanager’supkeepeffortdeliverslessactual
upkeep service than one hour of the occupant’s effort.2 Let χ ≤ 1b et h e
relative efﬁciency of the manager’s effort. We thus have
Ut =




If the manager does the upkeep, his work is monitored, i.e., the actual
amount of upkeep services delivered to the property is publicly known. The
wage of a manager is wm. If the occupant does the upkeep, only she knows
how much upkeep effort she really provides (i.e., the occupant’s upkeep effort
is private information). In either case, because nonconstant Ut is inefﬁcient,
the upkeep effort will be constant over time, i.e., for all t, ht = h and/or
hm
t = hm for some constants h and hm.
Households
A household has initial ﬁnancial assets, A0, and can earn a wage, w, per hour
ofworkinoutsideemployment. Weassumethatwagew ispublicinformation
and constant over the interval [0,T]. The household has ¯ l hours to allocate
between outside work, house maintenance/upkeep work, and leisure per unit
of time. We will also refer to the household as the occupant, or agent.
Household preferences are over the consumption of housing services,
nonhousing consumption, ct, and leisure, lt, over the time interval [0,T),a s
2 If the occupant provides upkeep, she is not monitored. Unlike the hired manager, however,
the occupant does not incur the costs of travel to the site where she provides upkeep, because
she lives there. She can also develop site-speciﬁc maintenance skills over time. Hagerty (2008)
describes a recent case in which hired maintenance costs turned out to be very high in a large
scattered real estate investment joint venture due to the managers’ moving around cost and the
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well as over its end-of-period wealth, AT. Final wealth AT may depend on
the realization of R. Housing services are obtained by means of occupying
a house. A house of initial value H0 gives the occupant a normalized ﬂow
of H0 units of housing services consumption at every t ∈ [0,T). Thus,
the assumption here is that housing services consumption cannot be adjusted





e−rtu(ct,l t,H 0)dt + e−rTE[V(A T)|U], (2)
where the ﬂow utility function, u, is assumed to be increasing in each of its
three arguments; the end-of-period wealth value function, V, is assumed to
be increasing and concave in end-of-period wealth AT; and E[·|U] denotes
conditional expectation. Note that the above notation indicates that the agent
consumesthehousingservicesthatthehousingunitofsizeH0 producesduring
theperiod,butnotthehousingunititself. Notealsothatthereisnouncertainty
in this model at any t<T.
The riskless rate of interest is taken to be equal to the household’s subjec-
tive discount rate, and, therefore, will also be denoted by r.
Banks/Lenders/Landlords
Lenders/landlords have access to funds sufﬁcient to purchase housing capital
in sufﬁciently large amounts, are risk neutral, and discount at the rate r.W e
will refer to these agents as banks.
Contracts
At t = 0, the household and a bank enter a contract that speciﬁes the housing
investment,H0,andthepayments,X,tobemade. Theﬂowofhousingservices
H0 generated by the investment H0 will go to the household, i.e., the contract
says that the agent has the right to occupy the property during the period. The
contract also speciﬁes payments X that the agent/occupant is to make to the
bank. Finally, the contract speciﬁes who is to provide upkeep on the property
for the duration of the contract. In detail, the contract between them speciﬁes
the following:
1. The investment H0 made by the bank for the use of the agent.
2. The payments from the agent to the bank that the agent will make as a
payment for the ﬂow of housing services
X ={ X0,X T(R),(xt)0<t<T},
where X0 and XT(R) are lumpy payments at the beginning and the end
of the period, and xt is the ﬂow rate of payment within the period. The72 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
ﬁnal payment XT can depend on the realized return R on the housing
investment. Forreasonsofhouseholdlimitedliabilitywithnorecourse,
we assume that XT(R) ≤ 0 for any R.
3. The assignment of the upkeep duty m ∈{ 0,1}.I f m = 1, then the
contract says that an outside property manager is to be hired by the
bank. If m = 0, then no outside manager is to be hired. (Note that m
cannot be changed during the period.)
Note that the ﬁnal payment XT(R) determines how the end-of-period
value of the property, HT(R) = RH0, is to be split between the bank and the
agent.
Letacontract{H0,X,m}bedenotedbyC. GivenacontractC,theagent’s
initial assets A0, and wage w, the agent chooses h and (ct,l t)0≤t≤T so as to
maximize his expected utility (2) subject to the ﬂow constraints
dAt = (rAt + yt − ct − xt)dt for t ∈ (0,T),
where yt = w(¯ l − lt − h), and subject to the borrowing constraints At ≥ 0
for all t.
From the ﬂow constraints, we have that




er(t−s)(ys − cs − xs)ds (3)
for all t<T. Let AT− denote the assets held by the agent just prior to T, i.e.,
before the ﬁnal payment XT(R) is made. That is: AT− = limt→T At. The
agent’s ﬁnal wealth AT(R) is given by
AT(R) = AT− − XT(R). (4)
The borrowing constraints for t<Tand limited liability, XT ≤ 0, imply that
AT(R) ≥ 0 for any R.
AnallocationAisacompletedescriptionoftheoutcomeinthiscontracting
problem. Thus, A ={ C,hm,h,U,(c t,l t,A t)0≤t≤T}.
Let I be the indicator of adequate effort, i.e., I = 1i fU ≥ ˆ U, and I = 0




e−rtu(ct,l t,H 0)dt + e−rTE[V(A T(R))|U],
where
E[V(A T(R))|U] = (1 − Ip)V(A T(R)) + IpV(AT(R)).
The expected proﬁt an allocation gives to the bank is





t )dt + e−rTE[HT(R) + XT(R)|U],
where
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We assume that there are potentially many banks competing against each
other and, thus, all gains from trade are captured by the agent.
The timing in the model is as follows: (1) The bank offers a contract C.
(2)The agent accepts and makes payments X0 and (xt) to the bank. If m = 0,
the agent chooses h.I f m = 1, the bank chooses hm. The agent chooses
(ct,l t,A t)0≤t≤T. (3) Return R is realized at T and the bank makes payment
−XT(RT) to the household.
Transfer and use of physical property, as well as any payments between
the agent and the bank, are observable, can be enforced, and therefore are
contractible. Other variables in the model are not. Thus, the bank cannot
control (e.g., because it cannot observe or verify in court) the household’s
choices of h or (ct,l t,A t)0≤t≤T.
The market contract (which we will also call the competitive contract)
is that contract C that gives rise to the ﬁnal allocation that maximizes the
expected utility for the agent subject to zero expected proﬁt for the bank. In
this article, we will characterize the competitive contract. In particular, we
will show that the optimal contract with m = 1 is akin to renting while the
optimal contract with m = 0 is similar to owning the house with a mortgage.
With this, we can use this model to examine which contract would prevail in
equilibrium, absent taxes or other distortions.
Ourstrategyforﬁndingtheundistortedmarketcontractisasfollows. First,
we study the case of hired upkeep. Second, we study the case of occupant-
providedupkeep. Finally,wecomparethetwoconditionallyoptimalcontracts
and allocations to ﬁnd the overall optimum.
2. CONTRACTS WITH HIRED UPKEEP
In this section, we consider contracts with m = 1. This means that upkeep is




the best contract C for the agent is separable from the agent’s utility maxi-
mization problem. In other words, the bank’s cost of a contract with m = 1
is independent of any unobservable choices of the agent (in particular, it does
not depend on the agent’s choice of h).
The contract C ={ H0,X,1} is feasible if the expected proﬁt to the bank
is nonnegative. We will write C1 to denote a contract C ={ H0,X,1}. In the
next section, we will write C0 to denote a contract C ={ H0,X,0}. Let  
denote the expected proﬁt of the bank. Under a contract C1, i.e., with m = 1,74 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
we have















The value of the expected proﬁt under a contract with m = 1 can be evaluated
using X, which is contractible, and hm, which is up to the bank. Thus, this
proﬁt value does not depend on anything that is not contractible or controlled
by the bank.
Because of competition, banks will offer to the agent a contract that max-
imizes the indirect utility of the agent. Let’s call any such contract an efﬁcient
contract. Inthissection, wewanttocharacterizeefﬁcientcontractsamongthe





R. The agent is risk averse and the bank is risk neutral. Thus, any efﬁcient
contract in the class C1 will specify the ﬁnal payment XT(R) = XT(R).
Given that the agent is not exposed to the risk of the return R, his indirect
utilityfunctiondoesnotdependonthelevelofupkeepU thatthebankchooses
toprovideonthepropertybyhiringamanager. Theindirectutilityoftheagent
under the contract C1, with XT independent of R, is thus given by






e−rtu(ct,lt,H 0)dt + e−rTV(A T− − XT), (5)
where




er(t−s)(w(¯ l − ls) − cs − xs)ds
and maximization is subject to At ≥ 0 at all t. Note in the above that h = 0.
Under a contract C1 with XT independent of R, the formula for the bank











R + Ip(R − R)

.
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where D0 = r−1(1 − e−rT) =
 T
0 e−rtdt is the date-0 value of a constant
payment ﬂow of one dollar over the time interval [0,T). Thus, the proﬁt
expression simpliﬁes to












Let us now consider the question of the timing of payments X. The bank is
obviously interested in the present value P of payments X, which is given by







At ≥ 0 he faces. For a given P, the more delayed are the payments from the
agent to the bank, the better for the agent. The following lemma, however,
showsthatspreadingthepaymentevenlyovertheinterval[0,T)isasufﬁcient
delay.
Lemma 1 For any given H0 and present value P of payments X = (X0,X T,
(xt)0≤t≤T),theindirectutilityoftheagent,U0(H0,X 0,X T,(x t)0≤t≤T),ismax-
imized by the payments schedule X with X0 = XT = 0 and xt = x for all
0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Proof. Ignore for a moment the nonrecourse constraint XT ≤ 0, i.e., allow
XT > 0. Suppose that all payments are loaded at the terminal date, i.e.,
X0 = x = 0 and XT = erTP. This payment schedule is the best for the agent
becausethepaymentsaremaximallydeferred,whichmeansthattheborrowing
constraints cannot bind. How would the agent behave in this problem?
Theagentwouldchoosect andlt soastoattainU0(H0,X 0,X T,(x t)0≤t≤T)














er(T−t)(w(¯ l − lt) − ct)dt − erTP

.
The ﬁrst-order (FO) necessary and sufﬁcient conditions with respect to ct and
lt give us
e−rtuc(ct,l t,H 0) = e−rTV  (AT)er(T−t),
e−rtul(ct,l t,H 0) = e−rTV  (AT)wer(T−t),76 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
which simpliﬁes to
uc(ct,l t,H 0) = V  (AT),
ul(ct,l t,H 0) = V  (AT)w,
and shows that constant consumption, ct = c, and leisure, lt = l, are optimal
for the agent.
Note now that under constant consumption and leisure, the agent saves a
constant amount equal to w(¯ l − l) − c at any point in [0,T). This amount
is such that the agent can make the ﬁnal payment XT = erTP because his
continuationvalueisverylowfornegativeﬁnalassetsAT. Butthisalsomeans




e−rtxdt = P (6)
instead of the ﬁnal payment XT. So, for any H0 and P, the payment schedule
with X0 = XT = 0 and x = P/D0 is optimal for the agent. In addition,
unlike the payment schedule with XT = erTP, this payment schedule does
not violate the nonrecourse (agent limited liability) assumption.
Interpretation as a Lease/Rent Contract
At this point, we note that the contracts C1, to which we have reduced the
problem, resemble renting. In fact, under such a contract, the agent makes
no initial payment to the bank and the bank makes no ﬁnal payment to the
agent. Duringthetimetheagentoccupiestheproperty(andthereforereceives
the housing services), the agent makes a constant payment to the bank. The
bank provides property upkeep by hiring a manager. This contract resembles
a simple lease/rent contract, where the payment x represents rent. From now
on, we will call a contract of this form a rent contract.
We note here that the rent contract with a constant payment rate is not
pinned down uniquely as an efﬁcient contract with hired upkeep. Any nonde-
creasing payment schedule with the same present value P gives the agent the
sameutilitybecausetheborrowingconstraintsarenotbindingwithincreasing
payments and so the agent can stabilize consumption and leisure while saving
a constant amount sufﬁcient to cover the payments with the present value P.
Efﬁcient Rent Contracts
We can now discuss the efﬁcient level of rent and the bank’s upkeep policy.
With constant payment x, and X0 = XT = 0, the bank zero-proﬁt condi-
tion gives us
D0x = H0 + wmhmD0 − e−rTH0

R + Ip(R − R)

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Theleft-handsideofthisequalityisthepresentvalueofthepaymentsfromthe
agent. Theright-handsideisthecostoftheinitialinvestment, plusthepresent
value of the upkeep expenses, less the expected present value of property
resale. For any H0, an efﬁcient contract picks hm such that the present value
of payments from the agent is minimized and the bank breaks even. Let hm∗
denote the efﬁcient rate of manager upkeep hired by the bank.
The bank may choose to provide adequate upkeep or not. Thus, hm∗ is
either zero or ˆ UH0/χ. The bank will provide adequate upkeep if and only if
H0 + wm ˆ UH0χ−1D0 − e−rTH0

R + p(R − R)

<H 0 − e−rTH0R.
Eliminating H0 and simplifying, the above reduces to
wm ˆ Uχ−1DT <p ( R − R), (7)
where DT = erTD0 is the date-T value of a constant payment of one dollar
over the interval [0,T). The above condition on the primitives of the model
will be satisﬁed if the threshold for adequate upkeep is relatively low, or the
wage of the manager is low, or relative productivity of the manager, χ, is not
too low, or the expected gain in the return on the property investment from
adequate upkeep is sufﬁciently high. We will assume (7) throughout.
Under (7), thus, hm∗ = ˆ UH0/χ, i.e., it is efﬁcient in the hired-upkeep
contract to provide adequate upkeep.
Substituting hm∗ back to the zero-proﬁt condition, we have
D0x = H0 + wm ˆ UH0χ−1D0 − e−rTH0





α = 1 + wm ˆ Uχ−1D0 − e−rT 
R + p(R − R)

. (8)
The constant α is, in a sense, the price of housing services under the efﬁcient
rent contract.
We assume that a>0. If it were not, the banks could invest in housing,
provide upkeep by hiring a manager, sell the property at T, and turn in an
expectedproﬁtwithouthavinganyoccupantsintheproperty. Inthissituation,
housing prices would adjust.
In Sum
We have shown in this section that with m = 1, i.e., conditional on the bank
providing upkeep, a simple rent contract with a constant rent paid by the
agent over the duration of the period is efﬁcient. Under this contract, the rent
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Also under this contract, the agent chooses to have a constant consumption,
c, and a constant rate of leisure consumption, l. The utility the agent attains
is given by
D0u(c,l,H 0) + e−rTV(A T),
where ﬁnal wealth,












must be nonnegative. This expression for ﬁnal wealth simpliﬁes to
AT = erT(A0 − αH0) + DT

w(¯ l − l)− c

.
The levels of housing, leisure, and ordinary goods consumption that the
agent chooses when offered a rent contract of this form can be obtained from
the FO conditions of the agent’s problem. These conditions are
D0uc(c,l,H 0) = e−rTV  (AT)DT,
D0ul(c,l,H 0) = e−rTV  (AT)wDT,
D0uH0(c,l,H 0) = e−rTV  (AT)erTα.
Simplifying, we obtain
uc(c,l,H 0) = V  (AT), (10)
ul(c,l,H 0) = V  (AT)w, (11)




In Section 4, we will use these conditions to compute the efﬁcient rent
contractinaparametrizedversionofthismodel. There, also, wewillcompare
this efﬁcient contract with bank-provided upkeep (the rent contract) with an
efﬁcient contract with occupant-provided upkeep, which we study next.
3. CONTRACTS WITH OCCUPANT-PROVIDED UPKEEP
In this section, we consider the case of m = 0, which means that no outside
property manager is hired and property upkeep is assigned to the occupant.
Thus, the manager’s hours are zero and upkeep U is determined by the hours
of upkeep effort provided by the household. In particular, (1) reduces to
U = h/H0.
We are looking for an efﬁcient contract of the form C0 ={ H0,X,0}.
Under any such contract, two cases are possible: the agent chooses to provide
sufﬁcientupkeep ˆ U,ornot. Hisincentivestoprovidesufﬁcientupkeepdepend
on the contract C0. In particular, they depend on the ﬁnal payment, XT(R).
If, as was the case under the lease/rent contract, the payment XT(R) does
not depend on the realization of R, the agent has no incentive to care for theB. Grochulski: Optimal Contracts for Housing Services Purchases 79
house. The bank, however, is interested in adequate upkeep because upkeep
inﬂuences the expected ﬁnal property value E[HT(R)|U], which affects the
bank’s expected proﬁt. Because the upkeep effort exerted by the agent cannot
(or is too costly to) be observed by the bank or an outside enforcer (court), the
amount of effort cannot be mandated by contract. Rather, for any contract C0,
the bank anticipates the amount of upkeep U that an agent will provide under
C0 and uses this value of U to evaluate its expected proﬁt from the contract
C0. This is a version of the classic moral hazard problem.
Contracts that Do Not Provide Incentives for
Adequate Upkeep
The bank may structure the contract C0 so as to make it worthwhile for the
agent to provide adequate upkeep ˆ U, or not. Consider a contract C0 not
structured to give the agent incentives to provide adequate upkeep, so the
agent chooses h = 0. The situation here is similar to the one in the renting
contract,buttheoutsidemanagerisnotpresent. Becauseitwasoptimaltohire
the manager to provide adequate upkeep under the renting contract, the best
contract that does not encourage the agent to provide adequate upkeep must
be worse than the best renting contract. Otherwise, hiring the manager for a
nonzero number of hours would have been inefﬁcient under renting, which
was not the case.
Because contracts C0 that do not provide incentives for the agent to exert
adequate upkeep effort on the property are dominated by renting, there is no
need to pay further attention to them.
Contracts that Provide Incentives for
Adequate Upkeep
LetusnowconsiderthecontractsC0 thatprovidesufﬁcientpaymentincentives
to the agent to provide adequate upkeep.
First,letusexaminetheconditionsacontractC0 mustsatisfytoensurethat
theagentchoosesadequateupkeepeffortunderC0. Clearly,theagentchooses
to provide upkeep effort if his total utility from optimally chosen leisure and
goodsconsumptionplan, conditionalonprovidingtheupkeep, exceedstheto-
talutilityhecanobtainbynotprovidingadequateupkeepjointlywithaleisure
and goods consumption plan that is optimal, conditional on not providing up-
keep. It is important to note here that, because leisure and consumption are
not observable to outsiders, the agent can use one leisure/consumption plan
conditionalonprovidingtheupkeepeffort,andanotherconditionalonnotpro-
viding it. For this reason, we need to consider two indirect utility functions
that represent the agent’s highest utility value conditional on the two possible
upkeep effort choices.80 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Let Uh(C0) denote the total utility the agent can obtain conditional on






e−rtu(ct,l t,H 0)dt + e−rTE

V(A T)| ˆ U

s.t. : At ≥ 0 for all t,
where At for t<Tis given in (3) with yt = w(¯ l − lt − ˆ UH0), and where,
as before, AT is given in (4). Note that this indirect utility function takes as
given that (the minimum) adequate upkeep effort is provided, i.e., the agent
works h = ˆ UH0 hours on upkeep (hence the notation Uh).
Nowconsidertheotherindirectutilityfunction,i.e.,theonethatrepresents
the agent’s value of not proving adequate upkeep. Note here that this value
function is the same as the value function of a renter but with a ﬁnal payment
XT equalXT(R)withprobabilityone. Inourmodel,inadequateupkeepleaves
nouncertaintyabouttheﬁnalrealizationofthepropertyvalue(thehousenever
gets the high return “by accident” when no upkeep is provided). Therefore,
inadequateupkeepinsulatestheagentfromrisk,justlikethelease/rentcontract
does. Thus, the indirect utility function of the agent who extends zero upkeep
effort is given by
U0(H0,X 0,X T(R),(xt)0≤t≤T),
where U0 is the value function of renting, given in (5).
Despitenotbeingabletodirectlyobservetheagent’sprivateupkeepeffort
choice, the bank knows that the agent will choose to provide adequate upkeep
under a contract C0 if
Uh(H0,C0) ≥ U0(H0,X 0,X T(R),(xt)0≤t≤T). (13)
This condition is often referred to as the incentive compatibility constraint,
IC for short. If it holds, the contract C0 gives the agent sufﬁcient incentive to
provide adequate upkeep because doing so is in the agent’s own best interest.
Because of competition among banks, in equilibrium in which banks do
nothiremanagers,theequilibriumcontractprovidedtotheagent,tobedenoted
by C0∗, and the house of size H0 the agent will occupy maximize the agent’s
expected utility Uh(C0) subject to the bank’s zero-proﬁt condition






HT(R) + XT(R)| ˆ U

= 0,
and subject to the incentive compatibility condition (13).
Our task now is to characterize C0∗. The next lemma is standard in moral
hazard models.
Lemma 2 In any feasible contract C0 = (H0,X), where X = (X0,(x t),
XT(R)), the ﬁnal payment XT(R) satisﬁes
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Proof. Suppose XT(R) ≥ XT(R), then the IC must be violated because by
providing adequate effort the agent not only exerts himself but also runs the
risk of facing a larger payment XT(R) due from him to the principal rather
than facing the smaller payment XT(R) that he can guarantee himself by not
providing adequate upkeep effort.
The intuition for this lemma is clear. For any house size H0, the payments
X must be encouraging upkeep effort, i.e., demanding a lower payment in
circumstances that are indicative of effort. The high realization is indicative
of adequate upkeep being done. In fact, it can only happen when upkeep is
adequate. The low realization is not indicative of adequate effort as under
adequate effort it only occurs with some probability less than one. Thus, the
paymenttotheagentatT,whichisgivenby−XT(R),mustsatisfy−XT(R) >
−XT(R).
This means that the IC constraint must bind at the optimum. Why? If IC
is not binding at an allocation with XT(R)  = XT(R), one can make XT(R)
and XT(R) closer, which provides more insurance and increases welfare of
the agent, so this allocation cannot be optimal.
Reducing the Contract Space without Loss
of Generality
In this subsection, we restrict attention to a particular subset of all possible
contracts C0. As we do this, however, we make sure that none of the contracts
we discard dominate all of the contracts that we do not discard. The next two
lemmas provide results similar to these of Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 It is without loss of generality to only consider contracts C0 in
which the payment rate xt is constant and X0 = 0.
Proof. Consider a feasible contract C0 = (H0,X)with X = (X0,(x t),
XT(R)) that satisﬁes the IC constraint, i.e., provides the agent with incentives
for adequate upkeep effort ˆ h = H0 ˆ U. We claim that the contract C0c =
(H0,Xc) with Xc = (0,xc,X T(R)), where





is also feasible and at least as good for the agent as the original contract C0.
It clearly generates zero expected proﬁt for the bank, provided that, under the
modiﬁed payment plan Xc, the agent does not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to shirk, i.e.,
deviate from providing upkeep. We claim that the fact that he does not ﬁnd
shirking attractive under C0 implies that he will not ﬁnd it attractive under Xc.
First, we note that under the payment plan Xc, no borrowing constraints
will bind in the agent’s conditional utility maximization problems deﬁning
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either case, wants to smooth his consumption (of both goods and leisure). For
a given present value of payments to the bank, the agent may be unable to
perfectly stabilize his consumption if the payments are heavily front-loaded.
With X0 = 0 and xt constant, it is clear that this is not the case: Because
the payments to the bank are constant, the agent can perfectly smooth out his
labor effort, and, thus, the borrowing constraints never bind.
Consider now the following two possible cases for the plan X in the
contract C0, where the payments xt are not necessarily constant. One: no
borrowing constraints bind in the agent’s problem conditional on no-shirking.
Two: some bind.
In the ﬁrst case, it is clear that the utility attained under both shirking
and not shirking is unaffected by the switch from the payment schedule X to
Xc. The consumption path, ct, and ﬁnal assets AT− that the agent chooses
conditional on not shirking are unaffected by the switch from X to Xc. The
same is true about consumption and assets chosen conditional on shirking.
The contract C0c, thus, is IC simply because C0 is IC. The utility attained is
the same under Xc and X, i.e., is not worse under Xc, as claimed.
Inthesecondcase,switchingfromthepaymentscheduleXtoXc willrelax
the borrowing constraints in the agent’s problem conditional on not shirking.
The utility the agent can attain conditional on not shirking, therefore, will
increase. Our conclusion is true if the utility of the agent conditional on
shirking does not increase by more than it does conditional on not shirking.
It is easy to see that this in fact must be the case. We sketch this argument
here by giving the following two reasons: (1) Under the shirking strategy,
the agent has more time to divide between leisure and work; (2) under the
shirking strategy, the agent knows that the payment −XT he receives at T is
state-by-state less than what he gets when he provides upkeep, so he wants to
save more. Thus, when the agent shirks on the upkeep effort, he will work
in outside employment more and save more. The relaxation of the borrowing
constraints caused by the switch from X to Xc thus helps him less when he
shirks and more when he does not shirk.
Lemma 4 It is without loss of generality to only consider contracts in which
XT(R) = 0.
Proof. Suppose XT(R)  = 0. By nonrecourse, it must be XT(R)<0. By
the Lemma 2, we have that 0 >X T(R)>X T(R), i.e., the bank makes at
least the payment −XT(R) to the agent at T in every state. Consider now
the effect on the value functions of increasing uniformly XT(R) and XT(R)
(towardzero, i.e., decreasingthepayoutthatthebankwillmaketotheagentat
t = T), combined with a decrease in the payment rate x such that the present
value of the payments to the bank is unchanged (so the bank’s zero proﬁt
condition continues to hold). Under both the not shirking strategy and the
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structure simply by saving. Since the borrowing constraints were not binding
under the original payment plan and under either strategy (see the proof of
the preceding lemma), they are not binding now. Therefore, such a change in
the payment plan has no effect on either value function. Thus, there is no loss
of generality in considering only contracts with a payment plan X such that
XT(R) = 0.
Using these two lemmas, we can simplify the problem. We can take the
payments xt to be constant. We can take X0 = XT(R) = 0. Under these
conditions, the borrowing constraints will not bind. The agent, both under the
non-shirking strategy and the shirking strategy, will choose constant rates for
consumption of goods and leisure at all t ∈ [0,T).
The value function conditional on providing upkeep is thus given by:
Uh(H0,C0c) = max
c,l
D0u(c,l,H 0) + e−rTE

V(A T(R))| ˆ U







w(¯ l − ˆ h − l)− c − x

dt,







w(¯ l − ˆ h − l)− c − x

dt − XT(R).
The value function conditional on shirking (zero upkeep effort) is:
U0(H0,C0c) = max
c,l
D0u(c,l,H 0) + e−rTV(˜ AT)





w(¯ l − l)− c − x

dt.
The bank’s zero proﬁt condition is




+ e−rTpXT(R) = 0.
From now on, in the class of all contracts with m = 0, we only consider
contracts of the form C0c0 = (x,XT(R)) with X0 = XT(R) = 0. Thus, for a
given house size H0, the contract speciﬁes only the constant rate x of payment
from the agent to the bank over the time interval [0,t)and the ﬁnal payment
−XT(R) the bank makes to the agent in the state R.
Solving for an Optimal Contract with m = 0
Now we know that we can ﬁnd an optimal contract with m = 0 by adjusting
H0,x,X T(R) while keeping X0 = XT(R) = 0. Because XT(R) is nonposi-
tive, it will be useful to introduce a separate piece of notation for the payment
−XT(R) ≥ 0 that the agent receives at T in the state R = R. Let M denote
this payment to the agent.
For any ﬁxed H0, the problem of ﬁnding optimal x and M has a simple
solution. We know that absent the IC constraint, it would be optimal to set84 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
M = 0 so as to avoid exposing the agent to the risk of the realization of the
return R. With the IC constraint, in order to ﬁnd an optimal contract, we look
for a minimal deviation from this full-insurance contract. Because we can
only manipulate two numbers, x and M, subject to one linear constraint, it
is clear how to proceed. We start out with M = 0 and gradually increase it
whilealsoincreasingx sufﬁcientlytopreservethebank’szeroproﬁtcondition.
At M = 0, the contract is not incentive-compatible. As M and x increase,
however, the value of the shirking strategy decreases faster than the value of
the upkeep strategy because under both strategies the agent pays x to the bank
butonlyundertheupkeepstrategydoestheagenthaveapositiveprobabilityof
receivingtheﬁnalpaymentM. WethusincreaseM andx tothepointatwhich
the IC constraint is satisﬁed for the ﬁrst time. Then we stop. The contract we
obtain this way makes for a minimal incentive-compatible deviation from the
full-insurance contract, i.e., is efﬁcient. If this point cannot be attained, then
a house of the size H0 is not feasible to ﬁnance with m = 0.
The overall problem of ﬁnding an efﬁcient contract with m = 0 involves
also searching over all the values H0 that can be supported by a contract
described above. In the next section, we perform this search numerically.
Interpretation as an Ownership Contract with
a Mortgage
Suppose we have found an efﬁcient contract with m = 0 and some H0,x,
and M.I f HT(R) − M ≥ HT(R), then we can interpret this contract as a
nonrecourse mortgage contract with the agent being a homeowner and the
bank being a creditor whose loan is secured by a claim (lien) on the property
owned by the agent.
Recall that because X0 = 0, the bank pays the whole price of the house,
H0, up front. The agent then makes payments to the bank at a constant rate,
x, in return for (a) the right to use the house, and (b) the ﬁnal payment, M,
he receives from the bank if HT = HT(R). Motivated by the prospect of M,
the agent provides adequate upkeep on the property. Because the bank pays
the initial price of the house, it is natural to think of the bank as the owner of
the house, and x as of rent. But the positive ﬁnal payment M the household
receives is not consistent with this interpretation.
Alternatively,wecaninterpretx asaconstantpaymentonaloanofsizeH0
that the bank gives the agent to purchase the home. If at t = T the remaining
balance on the mortgage is HT(R) − M, then the ﬁnal payment M in state
R can be interpreted as money the agent walks away with after selling the
house for HT(R) and paying off the mortgage balance HT(R) − M. In the
state R, the value of the house is less than the mortgage balance, and the agent
receivestheﬁnalpaymentofzero. Thisoutcomeisconsistentwiththeowning
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simply walk away from the house. As the agent walks, the bank’s secured
interest in the property lets it take ownership of the house and sell it. Because
the proceeds, HT(R), are less than the bank’s claim, HT(R) − M, the bank
incurs a loss relative to the face value of the mortgage.
Under this interpretation of the efﬁcient contract with occupant-provided
upkeep, we can calculate the rate of interest that the bank formally charges on
the mortgage, to be denoted by ρ. Let Bt be the mortgage balance at time t.
Given that the loan amount at t = 0i sH0, in order for the bank’s claim on the
property to be HT(R)− M at t = T, the mortgage balance must satisfy
B0 = H0, (14)
BT = HT(R)− M. (15)
For the contract to be a ﬁxed-rate mortgage with the rate ρ, we must have
dBt = (ρBt − x)dt,
i.e., the change in balance at any point in time equals the interest that the
current balance accrues less the constant payment ﬂow x made by the agent.
Solving this differential equation for Bt and using the initial condition (14)
we have
Bt = (H0 − xρ−1)eρt + xρ−1.
Using the terminal balance condition (15), we get that the rate of interest






where DT(ρ) is deﬁned in the same way as DT but using the rate ρ instead of
r. Namely, DT(ρ) = ρ−1(eρT − 1).
We see that ρ ≥ r, and ρ>rwhenever HT(R) − M>H T(R). This
is intuitive: The bank breaks even at the rate r with its claim (and payoff)
being HT(R) − M in state R and HT(R) in state R. If the face value of the
bank’s claim is increased to HT(R) − M in both states, keeping H0 and x
ﬁxed, the break-even condition will hold only at a higher discount rate ρ>r .
The difference ρ − r can be interpreted as a default premium compensating
for the fact that in the state R the bank takes a loss, relative to the face value
of its claim.
We will use this interpretation of the efﬁcient contract with m = 0 in the
remainder.3
3 One could consider this interpretation of the contract as a more formal implementation
exercise, where the objective is to equivalently express the efﬁcient contract with m = 0 in terms
of instruments and contracts that are familiar and widely used in reality. In our case, these familiar
instruments are (a) an ownership right, and (b) a ﬁxed-rate, zero-down mortgage contract that does
not allow subordinated ﬁnancing.86 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
It is worth noting that the mortgage loan considered here must necessarily
forbid subordinated ﬁnancing. The bank issuing the mortgage needs to make
sure that the agent retains the ﬁnal payment M, as it is this payoff in the good
state that motivates the agent to provide upkeep. If, instead, the agent could
take out a second mortgage such that the amount he owes on this mortgage
at time T is M, the effective ﬁnal payoff to the household would be zero in
both states, which means that the household would not have an incentive to
provide upkeep. In this case, the bank’s expected proﬁt on the ﬁrst mortgage
would become strictly negative.
We also note that the household has an incentive to adequately upkeep if,
as we assume here, it stays in the home for T years and has a sufﬁcient equity
stake in the property at time t = T. It is not important in our model if the
household has a stake in the home at t<T(t = 0 in particular). Therefore,
no mortgage down payment is necessary in our model.4
In Sum
We have shown in this section that an efﬁcient contract with m = 0 can be
foundamongcontractsoftheformC0c0 = (x,XT(R)), i.e., takingxt constant
andX0 = XT(R) = 0. UndertheassumptionthatHT(R)+XT(R) ≥ HT(R),
any such contract can be interpreted as an ownership contract with a zero-
down,ﬁxed-rate,nonrecoursemortgagethatprohibitssubordinatedﬁnancing.
Also, we have described a procedure for computing such a contract and we
will use it in the next section.
4. PARAMETERIZATION
In this section, under speciﬁc parameter values, we solve for efﬁcient renting
and owning contracts, and check which one gives the agent a higher utility
value, i.e., which one will prevail in equilibrium. The parameter values we
take to reﬂect the proportions between the spending on consumption, leisure,
and housing that an average, inﬁnitely lived household would choose in a
simpliﬁed, idealized situation in which the ﬂow of housing services of any
size Ht can be purchased in a continuous spot market at the cost rHt.
Endowment and Technology
In order to model an average household, we take it to consist of two working-
age members that can at most work a total of three full-time-job equivalents,
4A down payment would probably be a necessary requirement in a model with a richer
(stochastic) structure for the mortgage duration T.B. Grochulski: Optimal Contracts for Housing Services Purchases 87
i.e., we take ¯ l = 3. We assume that one full-time job pays w = $40,000 per
year. Initial assets held by the average household, A0, are taken to be equal to
4w, which is $160,000.
We take T to be seven years. The annual interest rate is taken to be 4




which means that with adequate upkeep a house grows in value at the riskless
rate with 92 percent probability, in which case the seven-year rate of return is
33.1 percent. With 8 percent probability, despite proper upkeep, the realized
seven-year rate of property value growth is −33.6 percent. The threshold for
adequate maintenance is taken to be ˆ U = .2
4.5. This number means that it takes
a ﬁfth of a full-time job to properly maintain a house worth 4.5w = $180,000.
Thewageofapropertymanagerwillbesetat0.6w =$24,000. Theparameter
χ is set at 0.9 in this parameterization.
Preferences
Let’s suppose the household has log preferences of the form
u(c,l,H)= γ c log(c) + γ l log(wl) + γ H log(rH),
where γ c,γl,γH are positive constants. Here, wl represents the real cost of
leisure l consumed, and rH represents the real cost of the housing services
consumed. We take the constants γ c,γl, and γ H so as to obtain reasonable
expenditure shares for goods, leisure, and housing consumption under the
idealized conditions in which the household purchases spot housing services
H at the cost rH.
To do so, we use the following targets for parameterization. We take
that the average household works l = 1.5, i.e., one-and-a-half full-time jobs.
This means that we target the household’s labor income level at $60,000. The
annualcapitalincomeoftheaveragehouseholdis0.04A0 =$7,200. Wetarget
the total income, therefore, at $67,200. The value of the home the average
household occupies is taken to be H = $180,000. Thus, for the purpose
of ﬁnding a reasonable parameterization, we take that the household spends
0.04H = $7,200 on consumption of housing services, and the remaining
$60,000onconsumptionofgoodsandservices. Indirectly, thehouseholdalso
spends wl = $60,000 on consumption of leisure. The total potential annual
income of the household is $127,200. We now ﬁnd values γ c,γl,γH that are
consistent with these target expenditure shares under log preferences.88 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly













e−rtw¯ ldt + A0.
Becauseuisconcave,thehouseholdchoosesconstantconsumptionlevelsc,l,








subject to a ﬂow constraint (that we obtain by dividing the present value
constraint by r)
c + wl + rH = w¯ l + rA0.






H = 1/rμ, (16)
where μ is the Lagrange multiplier on the ﬂow constraint. We want to choose




with r =−log(.96) = 0.040822. Using the FO conditions (16), we get that
the agents will indeed choose these target values if the preference parameters
are
γ c = γ l = 1,γ H = 0.12.
In the remainder, we therefore take γ c = γ l = 1 and γ H = 0.12. For
simplicity, we will write γ instead of γ H.
To summarize, we take the household’s preferences to be
u(c,l,H)= log(c) + log(wl) + γ log(rH), (17)
with γ = 0.12.
To obtain a terminal value function V(A T) consistent with these prefer-
ences, we now compute the value of maximizing these preferences (without
any frictions or distortions) when the starting wealth is some number AT.
Substituting the FO conditions (16) to the ﬂow constraint we have
(2 + γ)/rμ= w¯ l + rAT,
which gives us
c = wl = rHγ−1 =
w¯ l + rAT
2 + γ
















w¯ l + rAT
2 + γ
) (18)
with γ = 0.12.





Under these parameter values, we ﬁrst calculate the value of the rent factor




i.e., the rent payment ﬂow level x is equal to 3.62 percent of the initial value
H0 of the rented house. This means that the present value of rent paid over the
course of one year on a house of initial value of $180,000 would be $6,390,
whichcorrespondstoapaymentof, roughly, $533permonth. Thebank’scost
of hiring adequate upkeep for a house of this size is roughly $346 per month.





The constant payment ﬂow x under this contract is
x = 7,200,
which corresponds to the monthly rent on the house of roughly $600. Under
renting, the household chooses ﬁnal ﬁnancial assets AT exactly equal to the
initial assets A0.
Owning
The optimal owning contract has the same constant payment ﬂow
x = 7,200,
and the same dollar expenditures on the consumption of goods and leisure:90 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
c = 59,600,
lw = 59,600.
The optimal house size, however, is smaller:
H0 = 140,400.
A home of this size takes the fraction
ˆ UH0 = 0.16
of a full-time job to adequately upkeep. The income ﬂow of the agent under
owning is
y = 54,000.
Note that the homeowning household is dissaving over the interval [0,T)in
termsoftheﬁnancialassetholdings. Itsequitypositioninthehouse, however,
is growing during this time. The optimal owning contract provides the ﬁnal
payment in the good state
M =− X(R) = 54,800,




As the household dissaves, its wealth at T in the bad state R is equal to only
109.6
160 =68.5 percent of its initial wealth. In the good state R, its wealth is
164.4
160 =102.75 percent of the initial wealth. Thus, the homeowning household
is exposed to a substantial amount of risk.




The mortgage face value at t = T is HT(R)−M = $131,600. Thus, over the
seven years of owning, the agent pays the initial balance of $140,400 down by
only $8,800. In the good state R, the household’s equity stake in its home is
54,800
186,400 =29.3 percent at t = T. The loan’s loan-to-value ratio drops from 100
percent at t = 0 to 70.7 percent at t = 7. With probability 8 percent, the bank
takes at time T a loss of $38,400, which equals 29.1 percent of its claim’s face
value at t = T (thus, the loss-given-default ratio is close to 30 percent). The
rate of interest sufﬁcient to compensate for this loss is
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This rate exceeds the riskless rate, r, by 28 basis points, which corresponds to
about 7.3 percent of the riskless (continuously compounded) rate of r = 4.08
percent.
Comparing Renting and Owning
The total expected utility value provided to the agent under the renting con-
tract turns out to be higher than the value under the owning contract. Thus,
the renting contract is the contract that the bank offers to the household in
equilibrium.
In the parameterization used here, the household’s opportunity cost of
time, w = $60,000, is much higher than the cost of hiring property manage-
ment services, which is represented by wm/χ = $26,666.67. In the friction-
less environment, therefore, it would clearly be efﬁcient to hire a manager to
perform home maintenance. In our model, private information makes it nec-
essary to expose the homeowner to the home resale-value risk. The negative
impact of this exposure, however, is not large enough in this parameterization
to overweigh the fundamental advantage of using the agent with the lower
opportunity cost of time to perform maintenance.
To get a sense of how much more attractive than owning renting is in this
parameterization, we can calculate how much of its initial ﬁnancial assets A0
the household would be willing to give up in order to avoid having to live in a
world in which it must own and cannot rent. Lowering the initial assets A0 in
the renter’s problem decreases the utility level attained. This utility does not
drop to the level attained under the owning contract before A0 is decreased
from $160,000 to $140,480, which is a 12.2 percent drop.
5. CONCLUSION
This article studies a simple model in which renting and owning arise endoge-
nouslyastwoalternativeformsofcontractthatahouseholdcanusetopurchase
housing services. In this model, the household’s effort, leisure, savings, and
goods consumption are private information, i.e., cannot be used as conditions
in the household’s contract with a bank or landlord. Even if the household has
savingssufﬁcienttopurchaseahomeoutright,doingsoisnotoptimalbecause
of the property resale-value risk the outright homeowner faces.
Our model shows that the nonrecourse clause in mortgage lending can
have a useful role in risk sharing: By taking out a nonrecourse mortgage,
a household can obtain partial insurance against the idiosyncratic risk to its
home resale value. Renting, however, is a contracting alternative that allows
thehouseholdtohireoutpropertyupkeepandobtainfull,notpartial,insurance
against the home resale-value risk. In this context, it is worth noting that any
government policies promoting homeownership also promote undiversiﬁed
risk taking by risk-averse households.92 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The analysis of this article can be extended in two main directions. First,
one can use the current stylized model to examine the effects of various gov-
ernment policies on housing market outcomes. Even under the parameter
values we use in this article, it is possible to characterize a set of government-
provided indirect subsidies to homeowning large enough to cause the average
householdtoswitchfromrentingtoowninginequilibrium. Second,themodel
itself can be extended to allow for transaction costs, shocks to the duration
of occupancy, household income risk, and aggregate shocks like unexpected
inﬂation, among others.
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